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Any and Eventualities
Jacques Jayez∗and Lucia Tovena†
1 Introduction
Proceedings of the 14th Amsterdam Colloquium, December 19-21, 2003
Paul Dekker and Robert van Rooy (eds.)
The fact that any has both a Free Choice (FC) and a Polarity Sensitive
(PS) profile has been the source of many controversies (see [4],[5] for recent
inventories). If one assumes, following in particular [1], [3], [6], [9], that FC
items in general avoid reference to particular individuals involved in episodic
predications, the examples in (1) are problematic, since all these sentences are
episodic and refer to particular individuals (books, students, girls). One might
dispute the relevance of (1a) by insisting that PS any is different. However
(1b,c) are traditionally considered as FC uses. Must we create a third non–PS
and non–FC any for such cases? In this paper, by postulating different modes of
free choiceness, we show that the different behaviors of any represent different
grammaticalized ‘answers’ (i.e. constraints) to the same problem.
(1) a. Mary didn’t read any book of the list
b. Any student ∗(who had cheated) was suspended
c. Mary performed better than any other girl in her class
2 Intuitive description
We propose a unified analysis of any as an ‘arbitrary’ item and account for
both its PS and FC properties. Arbitrariness (Fine) means that all individual
differences can be neglected. More precisely, if we evaluate a sentence of the
form [any ] [P ] [Q], every P–individual which satisfies Q in some situation s can
be replaced by every other P–individual in s, or, equivalently, all individuals
are on a par. This is called Non Individuation (NI) in [6]. NI can be satisfied in
different ways, which represent as many versions of any. This accounts for the
persistent conflicting impressions that any is one (its uses are not unrelated)
and multiform (its uses cannot be derived from a common semantic core).
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Ê The clearest manifestation of NI is known as variation in the literature on FC
items (see e.g. [2], [3], [10]). Variation works well when we have several possible
worlds, as, for instance, in the Vendlerian imperative Pick any apple!. We can
imagine than any apple picked in a continuation could be replaced by another
apple of the initial set of apples. So, the individual properties of the apples do
not determine in advance which apple is to be picked or not to be picked.
Ë With episodic sentences, the situation is as follows. Assertions like (1d) are
out because the books that are read are determined in the current situation.
(1) d. Mary read ∗any book on the list
However, why is (1a) normal? Since Mary did not read any book on the list, the
books that are not read are determined (they are all the books on the list). We
distinguish between two scenarios of NI. The first is uniformity: all individuals
must be able to satisfy or not satisfy the same properties, as illustrated by
the case of variation (Ê). The second involves reference: even when uniformity
is respected, FC items avoid reference to particular individuals. E.g. (1d) is
excluded although it may be interpreted as ‘Mary read every book on the list’
because it entails that particular books were read. Referential properties depend
on different factors, among which the nature of eventualities. Any ‘considers’
objects participating in a particular, spatio–temporally situated, eventuality
as individuated. PS environments do not refer to positive eventualities: there
is no proper positive event of Mary ‘not reading’ a book because there is no
spatio–temporal location at which the event would develop.1 Similarly, in a
question like Did Mary read any book?, there is no mention of a reading event. PS
environments simply do not give rise to the kind of individuation that any can
detect, namely one which is grounded in positive eventualities. The exclusion
of positive eventualities accounts immediately for the fact that sentences that
entail (1a) are anomalous if they mention genuine positive eventualities (1e).
(1) e. Mary successively ∗refused to read any book on the list
The idea that any forbids positive events raises the following problem. Suppose
that a certain apple cannot be picked in any follow–up to a Vendlerian impera-
tive Pick any apple!.2 If the speaker is aware of that and wants to include this
apple in the set of possible choices, any is infelicitous. Yet, not picking the apple
does not count as a positive event and does not individuate the fruit. But, to
be excluded in advance, the fruit has to be characterized by properties which
distinguish a subset of the set of apples. This configuration is incompatible with
NI, which prescribes uniformity.
1. Of course, the fact that not reading a book does not count as an event spatio-temporally
does not prevent it from counting as an event in other respects. The literature on so–called
‘negative events’ often mentions examples of the form And what happened? Mary did not read
my novel!, see [8].
2. The apple might be rotten, for instance.
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Ì Since (1b,c) refer to particular events, they should sound strange. (1b) illus-
trates subtrigging ([7]), that is, the fact that an otherwise anomalous any–
sentence is redeemed by adjoining an appropriate modifier, here a relative
clause. Clearly, there is a conditional relation between the VP content and
that of the modified noun in such cases. This makes the identity of the stu-
dents irrelevant (arbitrariness): students are suspended qua cheaters and not
qua particular students.
Í As for (1c), the crucial observation is that we cannot refer explicitly to a set
of particular events (2).
(2) On Monday, Mary beat ∗any other girl in the class
This indicates that (1c) refers to such events only indirectly. As in the case
of subtrigging, individuation by events is possible. Suppose that the girls in
Mary’s class were engaged in a chess tournament. The fact that Mary beat
Sally certainly depends on their respective individual strategies. But (1c) ac-
tually means that Mary reached the highest performance level when compared
to the other girls. The exact way in which this is achieved, that is the order
and content of the particular confrontation events, is irrelevant. Let {ei : i ∈ I}
be the set of particular confrontation events. Mary’s performance corresponds
to the set of results {rM (ei)}. The fact that this set is ‘superior’, with respect
to some measure operator µ to another set (that is, µ({rM (ei)}) > µ({rx(ei)})
for every other girl x) is not related to any particular ei in {ei : i ∈ I}. The
same configuration obtains if the competition is not a set of confrontations but
a comparison of individual performances (for example a competition between
athletes). If Mary jumps higher than Sally, there is (at least) two ways of ap-
plying an event–based ontology. First, we can say that there is an event of
Mary jumping higher than Sally, which takes place at some particular spatio–
temporal location. Second we can focus on the relation (comparison) between
the events of Mary jumping and Sally jumping. The possibility of (1c) suggests
that any does not pick up particular events in which Mary and the other girls
would participate, but a more abstract relation between events or sets of events.
Î Finally, note that we do not want to rephrase any as a garden–variety in-
definite (like a) combined with the NI requirement. For instance, (3a) and (3b)
are not equivalent, since only (3a) gives one the right to consult an unlimited
number of files. This is why we represent any as an existential quantifier on sets
rather than on individuals in (4.1) below.
(3) a. You may consult any file
b. You may consult a file, any file
3 Calibrating any
Ê E+ denotes the set of positive eventualities. We adopt a Davidsonian notation
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for eventualities.
(4) A sentence with a tripartite structure M([any ] [P ] [Q]), where M is a
(possibly null) modal operator,
1. asserts M(∃X(X ⊆ [[P]] & X ⊆ [[Q]])),
2. implies that there is no a ∈ [[P]] such that either:
a. ∃e,∃e′ ∈ E+(P (a, e) & Q(a, e′)) if M is null, or
b. 2∃e, e′(P (a, e) & Q(a, e′)) or
2¬∃e, e′(P (a, e) & Q(a, e′)).
(4.2) distinguishes two cases. For simple assertions, no positive eventu-
alities must be involved. For modal sentences, no individual in the restriction
P can be imposed or excluded as a satisfier of the scope Q. Clearly, (4.2a) is
too strong because it predicts that subtrigging is impossible. In (1b), there are
positive events of suspension.
Ë We replace (4.2a) by (4.2a’).
(4) 2a’. ∃e,∃e′ ∈ E+(P (a, e) & Q(a, e′)) if M is null
unless 2[∀x∀e(P (x, e) ⇒ ∃e′ ∈ E+(Q(x, e′))] holds.
(4.2a’) suspends the prohibition on positive eventualities whenever there is a
necessary implication between being a P–object and being a Q–object. In this
case, the positive eventualities can be interpreted as the manifestations of a gen-
eral constraint, which does not take into account the identity of the individuals
involved (arbitrariness).
Ì For comparatives, the intuition is that there is no genuine positive eventuality.
However, as for subtrigging, condition (4.2a) is too strong and so is condition
(4.2a’). The problem comes from the fact that we cannot deny the status of
eventuality to did–better–than(Mary, x). So (1c) can be translated as:
∀x((in–Mary’s–class(x) & x 6= Mary) ⇒ ∃e did–better–than(Mary, x, e)).
Since the sentence presupposes that there are girls in Mary’s class, it implies
that there are positive eventualities of Mary doing better than other girls. We
saw in section 2.Í that, in such cases, any selects the relations between events.
So we rephrase (4.2a’) as (4.2a”).
(4) 2a”. ∃e,∃e′ ∈ E+(P (a, e) & Q(a, e′)) if M is null, unless
(i) 2[∀x∀e(P (x, e) ⇒ ∃e′ ∈ E+(Q(x, e′))] holds, or
(ii) for every e′ ∈ E+ such that ∃e(P (a, e) & Q(a, e′)), Q(a, e′) is equiv-
alent to φ(a) for some non–Davidsonian (possibly complex) expression
φ
(4.2a”) adds the idea that there is a non–Davidsonian property φ which
replaces the Davidsonian Q. Suppose that (1c) refers to a chess tournament in
which each girl must play against each other girl, and that the players are ranked
by number of victories. Let v(x, n) mean that x won n times. (1c) implies:
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∃x, e, e′(in–Mary’s–class(x, e) & x 6= Mary & did–better–than(Mary, x, e′)).
This form violates (4.2a”). The following form does not.
(5) ∃x, e(in–Mary’s–class(x, e) & x 6= Mary & ∃n, n′(v(Mary, n) & v(x, n′)
& n > n′)).
4 Remaining issues
Summarizing, we connect the PS uses of any with a sensitivity to positive
eventualities, the apparent exceptions (subtrigging and comparatives) with the
fact that regularities or relations are fore–grounded, leaving eventualities in the
background, and the modal uses with the variation requirement (uniformity).
Several problems remain.
Ê How does all this interact with NI? Uniformity and subtrigging clearly put all
individuals on a par. Comparatives and downward entailing sentences constrain
the reference to events. Comparatives do not forbid positive events that involve
particular individuals but they also refer to comparisons between events. Con-
sider two girls a and b in Mary’s class. If they each confront Mary, this gives
rise to two distinct events. If their performances are compared to that of Mary,
it is more difficult to say that we have events ‘of comparison’. One might object
that the outcomes of the comparisons may be distinct and help to individuate
a and b. The point is that, in a sense, the outcomes are reduced to the mini-
mal information that Mary did better than a and b.3 So, the relations between
Mary and a and Mary and b cannot be distinguished. The difference with (2)
is that, in that case, we may associate a and b with different events ea and eb,
whereas, with (1c), a and b participate in the same relation to Mary. Finally,
downward entailing sentences do not mention positive eventualities. Therefore,
it is impossible to distinguish individuals on the basis of their participations
in eventualities. We conclude that, in spite of their differences, all these cases
make the pairing of individuals with eventualities impossible or irrelevant.
Ë Uniformity, subtrigging and compatibility with comparatives can be observed
with FC items in French and in Greek (see [6] for n’importe quel and tout, and [3]
for opjosdhipote). Since there is no morphological relation between these items
and any, it is unlikely that the sensitivity of any to eventualities is parochial.
Rather, eventualities constitute an important resource for individuation, and
forbidding these resources or making them inefficient is a standard strategy for
ensuring NI. PS behavior is not observed with the items mentioned above. Lack
of space precludes a discussion of the possible accounts one can propose for this
difference.
Ì It is well–known that any oscillates between an existential and a universal
interpretation. It has been proposed that FC items tend to be indefinites and
3. Note that, in (5), the outcomes n and n′ are bound by ∃ and thus convey no specific
information.
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that their universal interpretation comes from the interchangeability of indi-
viduals across worlds (uniformity), see [3] in particular. How this derives the ∀
behavior observed in subtrigged sentences and comparatives is not quite clear,
however.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed that the different uses of any are manifestations
of the general constraint NI. All the cases we have reviewed concern the way
in which any links individuation and eventualities. As noted in [11], the French
item le moindre, whose scalar origin is clear, has a very similar distribution.
Future work will have to say whether scalarity plays a central role for any, as
advocated in [5], and, more generally, for items which have both a PS and a FC
sensitivity.
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